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 Moral injury encompasses the negative behavioral, psychological, social, and 
spiritual consequences that arise after an individual experiences events that violate his or 
her deeply held moral beliefs, whether by commission, omission, or witnessing such an 
action by another individual. To date, moral injury and the only measure used to assess 
moral injury have only been studied with military populations and within the context of 
traumatic transgressions. In the current study, we first address the applicability of moral 
injury to youth populations and nontraumatic transgression. Secondly, we present the 
development and initial psychometric properties of the Moral Injury Perpetration, Self-
forgiveness, and Atonement Scales for Youth (MIPSASY) in a sample of emerging 
adults. Participants included 379 primarily female, Caucasian undergraduates recruited 
from a psychology participant pool at a large Western university. Results of confirmatory 
factor analysis and parallel analysis indicated that the moral injury subscales of the 
MIPSASY have a five-factor latent structure. Further, results indicated that the 
MIPSASY scales demonstrate good internal consistency, test-retest reliability, 
convergent and divergent validity, and that the factor structure is invariant across 
genders. Future research will need to continue to validate the MIPSASY in youth 
populations given that moral injury is an important construct to include in the study of 




growing literature on moral injury and is the first study to describe how moral injury may 
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 In our everyday interactions we are likely to encounter interpersonal situations in 
which we perpetrate harm on others. This harm may be physical, emotional, or relational 
and may be unintentional as we navigate between our needs and the needs of others. 
Being able to make sense of these events is essential to one’s ability to maintain positive 
self-regard (Bandura, 1991; Bandura, 2002). As a result, a fundamental developmental 
task for children, adolescents, and emerging adults is to be able to make sense out of their 
transgressions as they develop their own moral identity and agency. Given that becoming 
a moral individual is important to the maintenance of a just and fair society, it is no 
surprise that examining how moral development progresses over development has been 
well-studied over a number of decades (Bandura, 1991; Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969; 
Piaget, 1932; Smetana, 2006). 
 However, we know less about the psychological and emotional consequences that 
ensue after young people have intentionally or intentionally caused another.  Can harm 
come as a consequence of causing harm to others? In his book recounting the personal 
stories of gang-involved youth participating in a gang-intervention program, Gregory 
Boyle (2011) eloquently attests that the violent acts these youth have perpetrated have 
left psychological and spiritual wounds for these youth and describes this as “harm as 
harm” (p. 81). The construct of moral injury could provide a useful framework for 
examining the psychological consequences that ensue when youth transgress toward 
others; however, moral injury has only been studied with military personnel and within 
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the context of traumatic transgressions. The goal of the current study is to first discuss the 
relevance of moral injury to youth populations and nontraumatic transgressions, and then 
second, present the development and initial psychometric properties of the Moral Injury 
Perpetration, Self-forgiveness, and Atonement Scales for Youth (MIPSASY) in a sample 
of emerging adults.  
 
The Construct of Moral Injury 
 Moral injury encompasses the negative behavioral, psychological, social, and 
spiritual consequences that arise after an individual experiences events that violate his or 
her deeply held moral beliefs, whether by commission, omission, or witnessing such an 
action by another individual (Litz et al., 2009).  Individuals who develop moral injury are 
theorized to bear a number of negative consequences. According to Litz and colleagues, 
individuals with moral injury may see themselves as “immoral,” “irredeemable,” and 
could experience negative changes in ethical attitudes and behaviors (Currier, Drescher, 
& Harris, 2014; Litz et al., 2009 p. 698).  Other proposed symptoms include guilt, shame, 
alienation, reduced trust in others, aggression, poor self-care and self-harm (Drescher et 
al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009).  Additionally, individuals suffering from moral injury are also 
thought to experience changes in or loss of spirituality, problems with forgiveness, and 
depression (Currier, Drescher, & Harris, 2014; Drescher et al., 2011).   
Litz and colleagues (2009) have proposed a comprehensive model of how moral 
injury may develop in the aftermath of transgressions within the context of military 
service. They conceptualize moral injury as “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing 
witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and 
expectations” (p. 700). They suggest that such events could “entail participating in or 
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witnessing inhumane or cruel actions, failing to prevent the immoral acts of others, as 
well as engaging in subtle acts or experiencing reactions that, upon reflection, transgress 
a moral code” (p. 700). Using this definition, they propose that the concept of moral 
injury will help scholars and clinicians alike address the psychological, biological, 
spiritual, and social consequences that occur after an individual violates their deeply held 
moral beliefs and values, including the aforementioned negative consequences.  
According to their model, Litz and colleagues (2009) suggest that it is not 
necessarily the exposure to potentially morally injurious events that leads to the 
development of moral injury. Instead, they suggest that it is how the individual ascribes 
meaning to the event, through processes such as shame, guilt, self-forgiveness, and self-
condemnation (Litz et al., 2009). In particular, moral injury addresses the moral aspects 
of traumatic events and actions that other constructs such as posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) fail to address. Therefore, the construct 
of moral injury can potentially help explain how individuals’ beliefs and sense of 
themselves as a moral being exacerbate the distress they experience after they have hurt 
another person (Wainryb, 2011). However, to date the concept of moral injury has only 
been studied within military populations and traumatic moral transgressions. The extant 
literature on youth’s moral development suggests that moral injury may be applicable 
across development and to nontraumatic transgressions. 
   
The Role of Transgressions in Moral Development 
 
Children’s moral development occurs within the context of their daily 
interpersonal interactions with family and peers (Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002; Kohlberg, 
1969; Piaget, 1932; Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005; Yoo, Fang, & Day, 2013). 
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Beginning in the preschool years, children begin to develop theory of mind allowing 
them to think in terms of self and other (Chandler & Lalonde, 1996). As they develop a 
theory of mind, they begin to learn that their own desires may not match the social norms 
they are required to follow resulting in both intentionally and unintentionally harming 
others. For example, researchers have studied how young children and adolescents handle 
conflicts of interests (i.e., activity or playmate preferences) with peers (Komolova & 
Wainryb, 2011), conflicts with siblings (Ram & Ross, 2001), and the process of children 
socially excluding others (Recchia, Brehl, & Wainryb, 2012). In sum, children and 
adolescents may act in ways that hurt others both intentionally and unintentionally.  
Some scholars argue that these transgressive experiences may provide a crucial 
context for moral development, especially in regard to developing what has been coined 
moral agency. Moral agency is defined as “people’s understanding and experience of 
themselves (and others) as agents whose morally relevant actions are based in goals and 
beliefs” (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010, p. 55). Specifically, Pasupathi and Wainryb (2010) 
argue that children and adolescents can develop moral agency by integrating the harm 
they do unto others with their broader sense of self, including their values, beliefs, and 
affective experiences. For example, by examining youth’s narrative accounts of harming 
siblings and peers, Recchia and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that youth construct 
meaning from these interactions and often describe these events in terms of their needs 
and the needs of others, although these interpretations may differ depending on their 
relation to the victim. Furthermore, they argue that parents may be especially integral to 
this process by helping their children construct meaning from these events. For example, 
mothers may scaffold discussions about transgressive events by helping their children 
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reconcile their negative behaviors within their larger identity as moral agents (Recchia, 
Wainryb, Bourne, & Pasupathi, 2014).  
One developmental period that may be important to individuals’ growth as moral 
agents is emerging adulthood, generally considered to be the age period between 18 and 
25. Even after adolescence has ended, research shows that emerging adults continue to 
grow as moral individuals within new contexts and developmental tasks (Kitchener, 
King, Davison, Parker, & Wood 1984; Krettenauer, Colasante, Buchmann, & Malti, 
2014; Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013). As adolescents transition to adulthood, they are less 
likely to be socially constrained by the supervision of authority figures, therefore 
providing them a context to act as autonomous moral agents. For example, during 
adolescence, parents may use “cocooning,” in which they prevent their child from being 
in certain contexts where deviant behavior may occur (e.g., situations without adult 
supervision, or those involving associating with deviant peers, etc.; Grusec, Goodnow, & 
Kuczynski, 2000; Padilla-Walker & Thomson, 2005). However, in emerging adulthood, 
individuals are less likely to live with their parents and therefore, may not be protected 
from the temptation to engage in immoral behavior, and in need to exercise their own 
moral agency. Furthermore, emerging adults must learn to be morally agentic within the 
context of new developmental milestones including romantic relationships and 
educational and vocational pursuits (Shulman, Feldman, Blatt, Cohen, & Mahler, 2005). 
For example, although most college students attest that cheating on a romantic partner is 
wrong, majority of college students report that they have cheated on a romantic partner in 
the past (McAnulty & McAnulty, 2012). Thus, emerging adults must continue to make 
sense of the harm they may intentionally or unintentionally do to others.  
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 In summary, the extant literature on moral development provides a rich basis for 
how individuals become moral agents, and that making sense of transgressions toward 
others is an important context for this development. By making sense of their 
transgressions, individuals enhance their moral development by construing these events 
into the context of their larger sense of themselves, their values, and their beliefs. 
Furthermore, this literature promotes the notion that youth transgress against others 
across development and actively strive to make meaning of these experiences; therefore, 
examining moral injury in youth is warranted.  
 
Limitations to the Existing Research on Assessing Moral Injury 
 
 Given that the extant literature has primarily focused on moral injury in military 
veterans (Currier et al., 2014; Drescher et al., 2011; Litz et al., 2009; Stein et al., 2012), it 
is no surprise that the only measure developed to assess moral injury was designed for 
use with military populations. To date, moral injury has been measured through the use of 
the moral injury events scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2013), a measure consisting of nine 
items used to assess potentially morally injurious events. Nash and colleagues found that 
the MIES had a two-factor latent structure (perceived transgressions and perceived 
betrayals), whereas subsequent research has suggested the MIES may have a three-factor 
latent structure (transgressions by self, transgressions by others, and betrayal; Bryan et 
al., 2014). Although a relatively new measure, the MIES has demonstrated internal 
validity, test-retest validity, and both concurrent and discriminant validity (Nash et al., 
2013). Further, subsequent studies have assessed the construct validity of the concept of 
moral injury more generally by utilizing in-depth interviews of military health care and 
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religious professionals, providing evidence that there is perceived clinical and research 
utility for this construct (Drescher et al., 2011; Vargas et al., 2013).  
Given that the MIES and the concept of moral injury have been used only within 
military populations, scholars do not have an appropriate way to measure moral injury in 
young people. This is unfortunate given the need to explore moral injury in younger, non-
military populations including children, adolescents, and emerging adults. Given that 
youth harm others in their daily social interactions, scholars are in need of a way to 
systematically measure moral injury taking into account that youth are still in the process 
of moral development, and therefore, moral injury may manifest and operate differently 
at each developmental stage. First, the types of transgressions among each developmental 
stage are likely to look different, coinciding with the developmental tasks of that stage, 
and therefore, may impact how moral injury develops and manifests in each age-range. 
For example, witnessing the death of a fellow service member may have a different 
impact than hitting a sibling during childhood vs. excluding a friend during adolescence 
vs. cheating on a romantic partner in emerging adulthood. Furthermore, cognitive 
complexity, the capacity for emotion regulation, and maturation of one’s values increase 
across the lifespan, all may impact how individuals may attribute meaning to potentially 
morally injurious events (Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013).  
In addition to understanding developmental differences, it also is important to 
investigate how moral injury may function differently between boys and girls and women 
and men. To date, the few studies examining the MIES, and the construct of moral injury 
more generally, have either not included women in their samples (Currier et al., 2014; 
Nash et al., 2013; Stein et al., 2012) or have not examined whether the factor structure 
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has been equivalent across sexes (Bryan et al., 2014; Nash et al., 2013). Prior research on 
moral decision making suggests that it may be important to examine whether moral 
injury functions similarly or differently across the sexes. First, although research has 
demonstrated that girls and boys reason about moral dilemmas in similar ways (Jaffe & 
Hyde, 2000; Walker, 1984), there is evidence to suggest that girls may be more oriented 
toward considering the needs of others out of empathic concern (Gilligan, 1982; Jaffe & 
Hyde, 2000). Secondly, researchers have found that women report feeling more guilty 
about real-life, interpersonal conflicts than men do, suggesting that women and girls may 
be more susceptible to experience shame and guilt after a transgression than men and 
boys (Skoe et al., 1996; Williams & Bybee, 1994), which according to Litz’s model 
(2009) would increase the risk for the development of moral injury. 
Lastly, a further drawback of the MIES and the extant literature on moral injury is 
that little attention has been paid to examining factors that may mitigate the effects of 
moral injury. Litz’s model (2009) suggests that moral injury may be mitigated by self-
forgiveness, forgiveness by others, belief in atonement, or belief in a just world. 
Furthermore, Dreshcher’s and colleagues’ (2011) examination of the construct validity of 
moral injury also suggests that forgiveness may be integral to moral repair. However, the 
MIES does not include any items that would examine these factors directly. 
Subsequently, as we examine moral injury we would need to assess these processes in a 





The Current Study 
In the current study, our primary goal was to create a developmentally 
appropriate-measure that would allow us to study moral injury among children, 
adolescents, and emerging adults within the context of nontraumatic transgressions. To 
this aim, we developed the MIPSASY and examined the psychometric properties of our 
measure in a sample of emerging adults. Because moral injury has been most-well 
studied in adults, and the only existing measure to validate ours against is normed for 
adults, we decided to study our aims in the next youngest age category, emerging adults 
(ages 18-25) given there are more developmental similarities (i.e., cognitive complexity) 
between these two groups as compared to children and adolescents. As discussed above, 
past research suggests that moral development extends beyond childhood and 
adolescence, in which emerging adults may be exercising moral agency for the first time 
without the social constraints of parents, with more developed values, cognitive 
complexity, emotion regulation, and within new interpersonal interactions (i.e., romantic 
relationships, higher education, work place).  
To accomplish these goals, we evaluated the following psychometric properties of 
the MIPSASY. First, we examined the factor structure of the MIPSASY scales in order to 
test our proposed four-factor structure of the perpetration subscales and single-factor 
structures for each of the three mitigating factor scales. Second, we examined the internal 
consistency reliability of the MIPSASY scales. We expected that each of the scales 
would demonstrate internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha values > .70. Third, we 
examined the test-retest reliability of MIPSASY by examining the correlation between 
the MIPSASY scale scores of participants 2 weeks apart. We expected that the 
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correlation between time 1 and time 2 scores would be significantly correlated and that 
intraclass correlation coefficients would meet the minimum cut-off of > .6.   
Fourth, we examined the construct validity of the MIPSASY scales by examining 
correlations among scales that should be similar and dissimilar to the moral injury 
subscales and mitigating factor scales. It was expected that each subscale of the 
MIPSASY (e.g., commission with agency) would correlate more strongly with measures 
of convergent constructs (e.g., the MIES transgressions-self scale) than with measures of 
divergent constructs (e.g., the Heartland forgiveness scale). Further, we expected that the 
moral injury total score of the MIPSASY would be related to internalizing and 
externalizing symptoms as well as shame and guilt. Lastly, we sought to assess whether 
there are gender differences in the factor structure of the MIPSASY by testing for 
measurement invariance. This hypothesis was exploratory in nature given that previous 





















In order to achieve our primary aim, we created the moral injury perpetration, 
self-forgiveness and atonement scales for youth (MIPSASY; see Appendix). The measure 
has two sections, moral injury (18 items) and mitigating factors (self-forgiveness, 
forgivability by others, and belief in atonement; 23 items). Participants rate the 41 items 
on a five-point likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree). Following from 
Litz’s model (2009), moral injury is comprised of commission with agency, commission 
under duress, omission, witnessing, and the experience of betrayal. Items were written to 
be comprehensive at a 3
rd
 grade reading level, according to the Fliesch-Kincaid Reading 
Level. Two items (items 2 and 14) were directly adapted from the MIES.  
Mitigating factors included self-forgiveness, forgivability by others, and belief in 
atonement. All three of these factors are believed to impact the development of moral 
injury. Items for each of these factors were adapted from existing measures that were 
situational rather than dispositional in nature and also were reworded when necessary to 
be comprehensible at a 3
rd
-grade reading level. The self-forgiveness scale is comprised of 
one item (item 19) adapted from the suicide cognitions scale (Gibbs, 2011), five items 
adapted from the Heartland forgiveness scale (items 20-24; Thompson et al., 2005), six 
items adapted from the state self-forgiveness scale (items 25-30; Wohl, DeShea, & 
Wahkinney, 2008), and three items generated by the authors (items 31-33). The 
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forgivability by others scale is comprised of four items generated by the authors designed 
to assess the respondents’ belief that others will forgive them for their transgressions. The 
belief in atonement scale is comprised of four items generated by the authors designed to 
assess the respondent’s belief that there are things they can do to compensate for their 
transgressions.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
 
Participants included 379 female (n = 269) and male (n = 109) undergraduates 
ranging in age from 18 to 25 from a large public university in the Western United States. 
The racial distribution of the sample was 73.0 % White/Caucasian, 12.7% Asian, 7.1% 
Hispanic, 2.9% Other, 1.6% African American, 1.1% Native American, and 0.5% Pacific 
Islander.  
All procedures were approved by the University of Utah’s Institutional Review 
Board. Participants were recruited from an undergraduate participant pool for students 
required to participate in research for course credit. Participants who did not wish to 
participate in research were offered an alternative credit assignment to reduce coercion. 
Undergraduate and graduate level research assistants described the study to participants 
as a group and provided informed consent. Participants who elected to participate were 
administered a battery of questionnaires on a desktop computer in a large computer lab. 
Prior to filling out the questionnaires, participants were asked to write about a time when 
they committed a moral transgression. The survey was hosted on Qualtrics, a survey 
program utilized in the social sciences that allows for online and offline administration.  
A separate sample of participants was recruited in order to collect longitudinal 
data to examine test-retest reliability of the MIPSASY. Using the same procedure 
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described above, participants who consented were administered the MIPSASY on a lab 
computer and then re-administered the MIPSASY 2 weeks after the initial administration. 
This sample included 140 undergraduates (nmales =  46; nfemales = 94) ranging in age from 
18 to 25. The racial distribution was similar to the original sample (68.6% 
Caucasian/White; 31.4% ethnic minority); 0.8% of participants dropped out between time 
1 and time 2 for a final sample size of 112.  
 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity—Perpetration, Forgiveness,  
and Self-Acceptance 
Moral injury. The moral injury events scale (MIES; Nash et al., 2013) is a nine-
item self-report scale that is designed to assess personal distress in regard to perceived 
transgression by others/self, and betrayal by others. It has two subscales: perceived 
transgressions by self or others and perceived betrayal by others. In the current study, we 
used an alternative factor structure derived from Bryan and colleagues (2014) which 
suggests a three-factor structure with the following subscales: transgressions-self, 
transgressions-other, and betrayal. Participants rate how much they agree with each item 
on a six-point Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree) with higher scores 
indicating greater moral injury. The MIES has demonstrated good construct validity and 
reliability. Internal consistency in the current sample was good: Total score α = .84, 
perceived transgressions by self or others scale, α = .86, and perceived betrayals by 
others, α = .81.  
Self-forgiveness. Participants completed the Heartland forgiveness scale (HFS; 
Thompson et al., 2005), an 18-item self-report measure designed to assess dispositional 
forgiveness, or the capacity for self-forgiveness outside of the context of a specific 
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situation. The HFS has demonstrated convergent validity, internal consistency reliability, 
and test-retest reliability. Participants rate each item on a seven-point likert scale ranging 
from 1 = almost always false of me to 7 = almost always true of me. The HFS contains 
three subscales: forgiveness of self (i.e., I hold grudges against myself for negative things 
I’ve done.), forgiveness of others (i.e., I continue to be hard on others who have hurt 
me.), and forgiveness of situations (i.e., I eventually make peace with bad situations in my 
life). Participants’ answers can be summed into a total score or using the three subscales. 
In the current sample, internal consistency was good, forgiveness of self, α = .77, 
forgiveness of others, α = .79,  forgiveness of situations, α = .78, and total score α = .89. 
The forgiveness of situations subscale was not used in the present analyses. 
Self-condemnation. The scales of psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989) were 
designed to measure nonhedonic aspects of well-being including purpose in life, self-
acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, and 
personal growth. The self-acceptance subscale was used in the present analyses which we 
construed as the opposite of self-condemnation. Participants rate 14 items on a six-point 
likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). A total score (α = .93) was used in 
the present analyses with higher scores indicating a positive attitude toward the self, 
acknowledging and accepting multiple aspects of self including good and bad qualities, 
and feeling positive about past life events. 
Construct validity—shame and guilt. Participants completed the state shame and 
guilt scale (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994), a 15-item, well-validated self-report 
measure of in-the-moment feelings of shame, guilt, and pride experiences. Participants 
rate each item on five-point likert scale (1 = Not feeling this way at all, 5 = Feeling this 
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way very strongly). The shame scale (α = .82) and guilt scale (α = .85) were utilized in 
the present analyses.  
 
Construct Validity—Internalizing and Externalizing Symptoms 
 
 The Beck depression inventory-II (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) is a well-
validated, 21-item questionnaire used to measure the severity of depression by assessing 
cognitive, affective, behavioral, and physiological symptoms. The instrument is not used 
to diagnose depression, but rather to identify depressive symptoms that are consistent 
with diagnostic criteria. Responses on the BDI-II are rated from 0 (low intensity) to 3 
(high intensity). Scores range from 0-63 with higher scores indicating higher depressive 
symptoms. Total scores of 0-13 are considered in the minimal range, 14-19 is mild, 20-28 
is moderate, and 29-63 scores of are considered severe. Reliability in the current sample 
was good, α = 0.89. 
Participants completed the 20-item trait and 20-state portions of the state-trait 
anxiety inventory for children (STAIC; Spielberger, 1973), which probes broadly for 
participants symptoms of stable or trait-like anxiety (e.g., I worry about making mistakes, 
I notice my heart beats fast, It’s hard for me to fall asleep at night). Items are scored on a 
1 to 3 scale, with a score of 1 indicating hardly ever and a score of 3 indicating often. The 
reliability and validity of the STAIC have been documented in samples of adolescents 
(aged 12-18; Kirisci, Clark, & Moss, 1996). Cronbach’s alpha in this sample was α = .64 
for state-anxiety and α = .90 for trait anxiety. The trait-anxiety scale was used in the 
present analyses. 
Participants were administered the 26-item adolescent version of the Cook-
Medley hostility index (Liehr et al., 2006), an empirically-derived measure used to assess 
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hostility. Participants rated items as True or False (e.g., I think a great many people 
exaggerate their problems to get the sympathy and help of others). Scores can range from 
23 to 92, with higher scores indicating greater hostility. The scale has demonstrated high 
internal consistency reliability and has been shown to be valid in a racially and ethnically 

































Factor Structure: MIPSASY Perpetration 
  
 To achieve the first aim, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to 
evaluate the theorized structure of the MIPSASY. It was hypothesized that 18 items 
comprising the moral injury section of the MIPSASY would load on to four factors 
corresponding to: commission with agency, commission under duress, omission, and 
witnessing morally injurious events. It was hypothesized that three mitigating scales 
(self-forgiveness, forgivability by others, and belief in atonement) would each have a 
one-factor structure. The CFAs were performed with MPlus 7.11 software (Muthen & 
Muthen, 1998-2011) using robust maximum likelihood estimation (MLR). Subsequently, 
we used the Sattora-Bentler chi square correction (Sattora & Bentler, 1994) in our chi-
square difference tests when comparing models.  
Adequacy of model fit was assessed using a variety of fit indices including the chi 
square, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the 
comparative fit index (CFI; Hu & Bentler, 1999), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker 
& Lewis, 1973), and the standardized root square mean residual (SRMSR; Bentler, 
1990). Although strict criteria do not exist to evaluate these various fit indices, Hu and 
Bentler (1999) propose that an RMSEA of .08 or less is adequate, whereas values of .06 
or less are excellent. CFI and TLI values of .90 or greater are adequate fit and values of 
.95 or higher indicating excellent fit. For SRMSR, values of .05 indicate adequate fit. 
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Lastly, nonsignificant chi-square values indicate adequate fit. However, in data with 
multivariate nonnormality and large sample sizes, the chi square can reject an adequate 
fitting model. 
For the four-factor moral injury model, factors were allowed to correlate and the 
variance of each factor was fixed to 1.0 for identification purposes. Results indicated that 
the four-factor model was a poor fit to the data, χ2(127) = 665.05, p <.000, RSMEA = .11, 
CFI = 0.83, TLI = 0.80, SRMSR = .06. Therefore, parallel analysis and exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) were utilized to identify the MIPSASY’s latent structure in the current 
sample. Parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000) allows one to determine the number of factors 
that are beyond chance. First, this analysis creates a random dataset with the same 
numbers of observations and variables as the original data. Next, a correlation matrix is 
computed from the randomly generated dataset and then eigenvalues of the correlation 
matrix are computed. The random data eigenvalues are then compared to the real data 
eigenvalues. When the eigenvalues from the random data are larger than the eigenvalues 
from the factor analysis, these factors are considered random noise rather than 
constituting actual factors.  
Next, the random data eigenvalues were compared to the real data eigenvalues 
that were obtained from an EFA that extracted 18 factors with the number of iterations 
fixed to zero. These results indicated that there may be seven factors. However, parallel 
analysis often indicates more factors than are warranted, and therefore, Buja and 
Eyuboglu (1992) recommend employing additional procedures to determine the number 
of factors. Subsequently, an EFA using principal axis factoring and direct oblimin 
rotation was conducted in order to examine the factor loadings of the seven-factor 
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structure.  Direct oblimin (oblique) rotation was chosen because it was expected there 
would be moderate correlations among the derived factors. Visual inspection of the factor 
loadings suggested that the commission with agency, commission under duress, and 
witnessing factors should each be further split into two factors.  
Upon examination, it appeared that these splits may be due to the fact that the 
items loading onto these split factors were similar in wording (for an example, see item 7 
and 8 in Appendix). From this examination, it appeared that a five-factor solution (see 
Table 1 for a description of each competing model) in which the witnessing subscale was 
divided into two factors could also provide adequate fit.  For example, in a study 
evaluating the psychometric properties of the MIES in a sample of Air Force personnel, 
Bryan and colleagues (2014) observed a three-factor structure of the MIES labeled as 
“transgressions-self,” “transgressions-other” and “betrayal.” This is in contrast to the 
two-factor structure originally conceived for the MIES comprised of “perceived 
transgressions” and “perceived betrayals” (Nash et al., 2013). Given these findings, it 
makes sense conceptually to separate items about betrayal from items that target 
witnessing transgressions from others.    
With these considerations in mind, the best fitting model was selected using the fit 
indices and chi square differences described earlier. Fit statistics for each model tested 
are provided in Table 2. Chi square difference tests using the Sattora and Bentler (1994) 
correction indicated that the five-factor solution was superior to the four-factor solution, 
Δχ2(5) = 428.39, p <.00, and that the seven-factor solution was superior to the five-factor 
solution, Δχ2(10) = 80.75, p <.00. When comparing the four-factor and five-factor 
solutions, the modification indices of the four-factor model indicated that most of the 
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four-factor model’s misfit was due to correlations between two items, items 7 and 8 as 
well as items 15 and 16 (see Appendix A). However, these problems were not present in 
the five-factor solution. Furthermore, the error residuals in the five-factor model were 
smaller than the four-factor model, with none of the standardized residuals exceeding an 
absolute value of three.   
In sum, although the seven-factor solution provided the best fit according to fit 
statistics, given concern about possible method issues, the five-factor solution was 
selected considering that it also had adequate to good fit, was more parsimonious, and 
was consistent with the theorized structure. Table 3 shows the unstandardized factor 
loadings of the five-factor model. Each factor loading was higher than the recommended 
.320 level (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The five-factor solution explained 65.07% of the 
observed total variance. The item-total correlations ranged from 0.31 to 0.69 (p < .00) 
with an average of 0.56. Skewness and kurtosis values for MIPSASY perpetration items 
were within normal limits, under absolute values of two and seven, respectively (Curran, 
West, & Finch, 1996). Skewness in the data ranged from -1.19 to 1.39; Kurtosis values 
ranged from -0.98 to 3.88.  
Correlations among the latent factors were estimated for the five-factor model. 
These results are displayed in Table 4. Correlations among factors ranged from small to 
moderate (r range = .16 - .46). The weakest correlations were between commission under 
duress and the two variables of witnessing (r = .16, p < .01) and betrayal (r = .19, p <. 
01). The strongest correlation observed was between commission with agency and 
omission (r = .46, p < .00). Sample descriptive statistics for the MIPSASY are presented 
in Table 5. No differences in means scores were observed between men and women apart 
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from the witnessing subscale. Men, m = 8.89, sd = 1.40, reported significantly higher 
scores of witnessing than women, m = 8.43, sd = 1.82, t =2.33, p = .02. 
 
Factor Structure: MIPSASY Mitigating Factors 
 
Separately from the moral injury subscales of the MIPSASY, we also examined 
the factor structure of each scale of the mitigating factors included on the measure. The 
three scales (self-forgiveness, forgivability by others, and belief in atonement) were all 
predicted to have a one-factor structure. CFA was again employed to examine each 
scale’s factor structure. A one-factor solution had adequate to good fit for both the 
forgivability by others scale, χ2(1) = 3.29, p = .07, RSMEA = .08, CFI = .99, TLI = .94, 
SRMSR = .01, as well as the belief in atonement scale, χ2(1) = .05, p = .82, RSMEA = .00, 
CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.02, SRMSR = .00. For the forgivability by others scale, the one-factor 
solution explained 50.76% of the observed total variance and factor loadings ranged from 
.64 to .78. The item-total correlations ranged from 0.77 to 0.81 (p < .00) with an average 
of .79 and values of skewness (-1.44 to -.93) and kurtosis (.83 to 2.17) were within 
normal limits. For belief in atonement, the one-factor solution explained 63.73% of the 
observed total variance and factor loadings ranged from .79 to .82. The item-total 
correlations ranged from .85 to .87 (p < .00) with an average of .85 and values of 
skewness (-1.37 to -1.11) and kurtosis (1.23 to 2.13) were within normal limits. 
On the other hand, a one-factor solution was a poor fit to the data for the self-
forgiveness scale, χ2(90) = 789.01, p < .00, RSMEA = .14, CFI = .68, TLI = .63, SRMSR = 
.09. Subsequently, we again utilized parallel analysis and exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) to identify the number of factors on the self-forgiveness scale. Using the 
procedures already described, results of the parallel analysis suggested that there may be 
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four factors. In order to examine the pattern of factor loadings, we conducted an EFA 
using principal axis factoring and direct oblimin rotation. Upon examination of the 
pattern of the factor loadings, it appeared that the items on the scale represent varying 
levels of self-forgiveness. For example, items 20, 22, and 23 (see Appendix) imply that 
the individual has forgiven him or herself, whereas items 26, 28, and 30 suggest that 
although individuals have done something wrong they can reconcile this with who they 
are. On the other hand, items 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 29, and 31 suggest that the individual has 
not been able to forgive him or herself. Similarly items 32 and 33 suggest that the 
individual has not forgiven him or herself and should be publicly shamed or ostracized.  
Given that the internal consistency of the scale was good (α = .90) and that the 
items represent varying degrees of self-forgiveness, we decided to use a total score for 
subsequent analyses despite the suggested four-factor structure. The one-factor solution 
explained 50.76% of the observed total variance. The item-total correlations ranged from 
.50 to .76 (p < .00) with an average of .65 and values of skewness (range = -.58 to 1.47) 
and kurtosis (range = -1.06 to 1.71) were within normal limits. Sample descriptive 
statistics for mitigating factors of the MIPSASY are presented in Table 5. No differences 
in means scores were observed between men and women on any of the mitigating factors 
scales, p >.05. 
 
Correlations among MIPSASY Scales 
 
In order to examine the relations among the MIPSASY moral injury subscales and 
the mitigating factor scales, we conducted Pearson correlations among all of the scales. 
Correlations among the mitigating factors and moral injury subscales are presented in 
Table 4. Self-forgiveness was inversely related to both forgivability by others (r = -.67, p 
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< .00) and belief in atonement (r = -.42, p < .00). Forgivability by others and belief in 
atonement were positively correlated (r = .46, p < .00). None of the mitigating factors 
were significantly correlated with the witnessing subscale or the betrayal subscale, p 
>.05, which indicates, as expected, that these are nonredundant constructs. However, the 
self-forgiveness scale showed positive, moderate correlations with commission with 
agency (r =.21, p < .00), commission under duress (r = .20, p < .00), and omission (r = 
.13, p = .01). Comparatively, commission under duress was inversely related to 
forgivability by others (r = -.13, p = .01) and belief in atonement (r = -.16, p < .01), 
although these correlations are in the low range. Both commission with agency and 
omission were unrelated to forgivability by others and belief in atonement, p>.05.  
 
Reliability: Internal Consistency 
 
The second aim of the study was to demonstrate the internal consistency of the 
MIPSASY scales. To this aim, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the best fitting model 
of the moral injury items (five-factor model) and the mitigating factors scales. Values 
>.70 are considered adequate, >.80 good, and >.90 excellent (Reuterberg & Gustafsson, 
1992). Results are displayed in Table 5. The moral injury subscales demonstrated good 
internal consistency with values ranging from .80 to .93. Similarly, the mitigating factors 




 To achieve the third aim, to evaluate the temporal stability of the MIPSASY, the 
association was examined between scores provided by participants the MIPSASY scores 
at the first time point and those administered 2 weeks later. Test-retest reliability is 
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considered good when the ICC > .6. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) for each 
scale and subscale were as follows: commission with agency (r = .84), commission under 
duress (r = .84), omission (r = .83, witnessing (r = .62), betrayal (r = .78), self-
forgiveness (r = .81), forgivability by others (r = .66), and belief in atonement (r = .69).  
 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
 
In order to test convergent and discriminant validity, perpetration of moral injury 
subscale scores were compared to of the subscales of the MIES and the mitigating scales 
were compared to existing validated measures of similar constructs.  It was expected that 
each subscale of the MIPSASY (e.g., commission with agency) would correlate more 
strongly with measures of convergent constructs (e.g, the MIES transgressions-self scale) 
than with measures of divergent constructs (e.g., the Heartland forgiveness scale).  
As expected, and demonstrating convergent validity, the MIPSASY betrayal 
subscale was most highly correlated with the MIES betrayal subscale, r = .63, p <.00, 
whereas the MIPSASY witnessing subscale was most highly correlated with the MIES 
transgressions-others subscale, r = .50, p <.00. Similarly, the MIPSASY omission 
subscale, r = .46, p <.00, and the MIPSASY commission with agency subscale, r = .54, p 
<.00, were most highly correlated with the MIES transgression-self subscale. 
Furthermore, the omission, r = -.08, witnessing, r = .02 , and betrayal subscales, r = -.08, 
were unrelated to the Heartland self-forgiveness scale (total score), p >.05. However, the 
Heartland self-forgiveness scale was negatively related to the commission with agency, r 
= -.14, p<.01, and commission under duress, r =-.17, p<.01 subscales, but it should be 
noted that these correlations were in the small range. In regard to the Heartland 
forgiveness by others scale, the scale was unrelated to the commission with agency, r = 
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.00, omission, r = .03, and witnessing subscales, r = .03 all p>.05. The betrayal, r = -.11, 
p = .03, and commission under duress, r = -.17, p<.01 subscales did demonstrate small, 
negative correlations with the Heartland forgiveness by others scale. 
In regard to the mitigating factors, we compared each scale to other measures of 
forgiveness and self-acceptance with the expectation that the mitigating scales would be 
related to these measures. As expected, the self-forgiveness, r = -.66, p<.00, forgivability 
by others, r =.48, p<.00, and belief in atonement, r = .35, p<.01, demonstrated moderate 
correlations with the Heartland self-forgiveness subscale. Similarly, the Heartland other 
forgiveness subscale demonstrated small correlations with the self-forgiveness, r = -.16, 
p<.01, forgivability by others, r = .21, p<.00, and belief atonement scale, r = .22, p<.00. 
Lastly, self-acceptance demonstrated moderate correlations with self-forgiveness, r = -
.55, p<.00, forgivability by others, r = .47, p<.00, and belief in atonement, r = .39, p<.00. 
Unexpectedly, the self-forgiveness scale was inversely related to the Heartland self-
forgiveness and other forgiveness subscale as well as the self-acceptance measure, 
whereas belief in atonement and forgiveness by others were positively correlated with 
these subscales  
As further evidence of construct validity, we expected that the moral injury total 
score of the MIPSASY would be related to internalizing and externalizing symptoms as 
well as shame and guilt. As expected, the MIPSASY moral injury total score 
demonstrated small, significant correlations with depression, r = .18, p < .01, anxiety, r = 
.28, p <.00, and hostility, r = -.18, p < .00. Higher moral injury scores were related to 
higher scores of internalizing symptoms, but interestingly, higher moral injury scores 
were related to lower hostility scores. In regard to shame and guilt, the MIPSASY moral 
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injury total score demonstrated moderate, positive correlations with both the shame and 
guilt subscales of the State Shame and Guilt Scale (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 
1994). These associations are consistent with Litz’s (2009) model in which shame and 
guilt are conceptualized as mechanisms of moral injury which lead to internalizing and 




 Our fourth aim was to test for measurement invariance of the MIPSASY moral 
injury subscales to determine whether the five-factor structure held for both women and 
men. Structural invariance is present when the factor structure or pattern of factor 
loadings on a measure is equivalent across groups (Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 2012). There 
are four aspects of invariance: configural, metric, phi, and residual. The structural 
invariance of the best fitting model (five-factor) was assessed using multigroup CFA 
procedures to test equality constraints across genders. In order to test for configural 
invariance, the factor loadings, correlations and covariances between factors, and residual 
error variances were allowed to vary between men and women. Results indicated that the 
five-factor pattern was equivalent across women and men, χ2(274) = 455.02, p <.00, 
RSMEA = .05, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, SRMSR = .06. The model provided an adequate to 
good fit for both men, χ2(124) = 189.69, p <.01, RSMEA = .07, CFI = .92, TLI = .90, 
SRMSR = .07, and women, χ2(124) = 239.67, p <.00, RSMEA = .06, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, 
SRMSR = .05.  
In order to test for metric invariance, the factor loadings, in addition to the factor 
pattern, were constrained to be equal across women and men. Results indicated the model 
was an adequate to good fit to the data suggesting that the factor loadings of the 
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MIPSASY are similar across genders, χ2(294) = 461.71, p <.00, RSMEA = .06, CFI = .95, 
TLI = .95, SRMSR = .07.  In order to test for phi invariance, the factor variances and 
covariances were also constrained. Results indicated the model was an adequate to good 
fit to the data, χ2(274) = 455.02, p <.00, RSMEA = .06, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, SRMSR = 
.07, continuing to suggest measurement invariance of the MIPSASY. Lastly, in order to 
test for residual invariance, the residual error variances were set to be equal. Testing for 
residual measurement invariance is the most constrained test of structural measurement 
invariance. Results indicated that model was an adequate fit to the data, χ2(304) = 655.43, 
p <.00, RSMEA = .08, CFI = .92, TLI = .92, SRMSR = .19, suggesting that explained 
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   Fit Indices for Competing Factor-Structure Models of the MIPSASY Moral Injury Scale 
 















196.78 .04 .97 .97 .03 
Note. RSMEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; 
TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; SRMSR = standardized root mean square residual. For all 
























Table 3  
Unstandardized Factor Loadings of the Five-Factor Structure Model of the MIPSASY 
Moral Injury Scale 
 




.77* - - - - 
Item 2 
 
.80* - -  - 
Item 3 
 
.69* - - - - 
Item 4 
 
.73* - - - - 
Item 5 
 
.62* - - - - 
Item 6 
 
.56* - - - - 
Item 7 
 
- -.87* - - - 
Item 8 
 
- -.84* - - - 
Item 9 
 
- -.86* - - - 
Item 10 
 
- -.87* - - - 
Item 11 
 
- -.88* - - - 
Item 12 
 
- - .77* - - 
Item 13 
 
- - .64* - - 
Item 14 
 
- - .88* - - 
Item 15 
 
- - - -.79* - 
Item 16 
 
- - - -.59* - 
Item 17 
 
- - - - .74* 
Item 18 
 
- - - - .88* 
Note. Factor 1 = Commission with agency; Factor 2 = Commission under duress; Factor 3 
= Omission; Factor 4 = Witnessing; Factor 5 = Betrayal. **p < .01 
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Table 4  












Total  Self-for Other-
for 
Bel-at 
























.82** .73** .71** .44** .39** 1 .25** -.10* -.14* 








-.07 -.13* -.03 .01 -.06 -.10* -.67** 1 .46** 
Bel-at 
 
-.10 -.16** -.05 .06 .02 -.14* -.42** .46** 1 
Note. Com-Age: commission with agency; Com-Dur: commission under duress; Self-for: 
self-forgiveness; Other-for: forgivability by others; Bel-at: belief in atonement. 







Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics of the MIPSASY Scales by Gender and Scale Reliability Estimates 
 
 Total Sample Males Females  






















8.57 1.72 8.89* 1.34 8.44* 1.81 0.80 
Betrayal 
 












33.47 9.82 32.92 10.67 33.70 9.47 0.90 
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Table 5 Continued 
 Total Sample Males Females  











16.77 2.90 16.67 3.16 16.81 2.79 0.86 



















Means and Standard Deviations for Validation Measures by Gender 
 
 Total Sample Males Females 












10.12 4.30 9.56 4.25 10.34 4.30 
HFS-Self 
 













32.66 8.64 31.89 9.11 32.97 8.44 
Anxiety 
 
41.03 8.23 38.49* 8.76 42.08* 7.78 
Hostility 
 





Table 6 Continued 
 Total Sample Males Females 
 m Sd M Sd M sd 
Shame 
 
9.23 4.20 9.20 4.21 9.24 4.19 
Guilt 
 
13.02 5.31 12.53 5.41 13.22 5.26 
Note. MIES = Moral Injury Events Scale; Bet = Betrayal; HFS – Heartland Forgiveness 
Scales; t-tests were calculated to examine gender differences among the validation 
measures. Men reported higher rates of witnessing others transgressions on the MIES, 























In the current study, we aimed to first demonstrate the utility of the construct of 
moral injury in the study of youths’ nontraumatic transgressions, and secondly, to create 
a developmentally-informed measure that would allow us to assess moral injury among 
children, adolescents, and emerging adults. As a first step to this aim, we developed the 
MIPSASY to assess moral injury and mitigating factors, and examined its psychometric 
properties in a sample of emerging adults. Specifically, we examined the factor structure, 
internal consistency, measurement invariance, and construct validity of the MIPSASY.  
Results indicated that a five-factor solution was the best fitting latent structure for 
the moral injury items on the MIPSASY. During the development of the MIPSASY, we 
originally envisioned a four-factor structure; however, our analyses suggested that the 
witnessing subscale should be divided into two separate subscales: witnessing and 
betrayal. This coincides with prior work in regard to the factor structure of the MIES, the 
only existing measure of moral injury, in which both Nash and colleagues (2013) and 
Bryan and colleagues (2014) found that the MIES contains a separate subscale that assess 
perceived betrayals by others. Furthermore, studies assessing the construct validity of 
moral injury have consistently found that betrayal and loss of trust are predominant 
themes in interviews with military veterans (Drescher et al., 2001; Vargas et al., 2013). 
Similarly, literature on youth’s traumatic experiences also suggest that events in which a 
youth’s trust is violated (i.e., by caregivers or other trusted adults) can result in worse 
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psychological outcomes than traumatic experiences that do not contain a betrayal 
component (Freyd, 1996). Subsequently, it will be important for future work to assess 
how morally injurious events with a betrayal component affect the manifestation of moral 
injury and whether these events result in worse outcomes. 
Apart from moral injury, results suggested a one-factor structure was the best fit 
for two of the mitigating factor scales, forgivability by others, and belief in atonement. 
On the other hand, results indicated that the self-forgiveness scale may contain four 
factors that assess varying degrees of self-forgiveness. Furthermore, we observed that 
these mitigating factors demonstrated moderate correlations among each other, and were 
either unrelated or demonstrated small correlations with the moral injury subscales. This 
demonstrates that the mitigating factors are nonredundant constructs. Litz’s and 
colleagues (2009) model suggests that these factors may influence the development of 
moral injury, and further research on the construct validity of moral injury also suggest 
that these constructs could aid in moral repair (Currier et al., 2014; Drescher et al. 2011; 
Vargas et al., 2013). Future research will need to test models examining how these 
factors may attenuate the effects of moral injury, both before and after morally injurious 
events occur. For example, it may be that youth higher in dispositional self-forgiveness 
may be less likely to develop moral injury after a transgression compared to youth low in 
this trait.  
Once the factor structure of the MIPSASY was established, its psychometric 
properties were evaluated. The MIPSASY demonstrated good internal consistency in 
which Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .80 to .93 for the moral injury subscales and .80 to 
.90 for the mitigating factor scales. Similarly, the MIPSASY demonstrated good temporal 
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stability with ICCs over 2 weeks, ranging from .62 to .84. We also demonstrated 
convergent and divergent validity. In regard to the moral injury subscales, they were 
more highly correlated with the MIES than a measure of self-forgiveness. Further, the 
mitigating factors demonstrated correlations with self-forgiveness and self-condemnation. 
However, unexpectedly, the self-forgiveness scale was inversely related to forgiveness of 
self and others as well as self-acceptance. It may be that the self-forgiveness scale is 
measuring another construct that is more closely tied to moral disengagement. 
Additionally, as expected, moral injury was related to internalizing and externalizing 
symptoms, including shame and guilt, which is consistent with the Litz et al. (2009) 
model of moral injury. Lastly, we examined whether the factor structure varied as a 
function of gender given that prior work has not included women in their samples and has 
yet to demonstrate measurement invariance. The MIPSASY demonstrated four levels of 
measurement invariance suggesting that it assesses moral injury similarly for men and 
women.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
A few limitations of the current study should be noted. One limitation of this 
work is the convenience sample utilized and their limited range of reported morally 
injurious events. Our sample was primarily a Caucasian, female, and college-educated 
sample of emerging adults. Therefore, more research is needed to evaluate the 
psychometric properties of the MIPSASY in additional populations including racially 
diverse and lower SES samples. Although not a focus of the present study, it should be 
noted that a majority of participants provided narratives about moderately transgressive 
acts in the context of romantic relationships. This is not surprising given that establishing 
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romantic relationships is a salient developmental task during emerging adulthood 
(Shulman et al., 2005). Subsequently, the validity and reliability of the MIPSASY needs 
to be extended to other populations with a wider range of transgressive events especially 
considering that the moral injury and the MIES were conceived in the context of extreme 
moral transgressions. Lastly, a limitation of the MIPSASY as it currently stands is that 
both the witnessing and betrayal subscales only consist of two items each. Moving 
forward, it will be important to add additional items tapping theses subscales, and 
validate their inclusion in future research.  
Additionally, it will be important to validate the MIPSASY and the construct of 
moral injury in younger populations. In the current study, we started with a sample of 
emerging adults given this population was the most similar in age and developmental 
level to the samples used in the existing literature of the MIES and moral injury more 
generally. However, in order to further examine the utility of the construct of moral 
injury in youth populations, the psychometric properties of the MIPSASY will need to be 
assessed in children and adolescents. Furthermore, youth populations that may be at 
particular risk for moral injury should be included in these samples. This includes child 
soldiers, detained youth, and gang-involved youth, all of which may be more likely to 
encounter morally injurious events in their daily lives (Kerig, Wainryb, Twali & Chaplo, 
2013; Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2010; Welfare & Hollin, 2012). 
Although this investigation has argued that youth are likely to harm others in their 
daily social interactions, the transgressions described thus far may not be as heinous as 
the transgressions that these at-risk populations may participate in. For example, gang-
involved youth may be required to perpetrate violence against others as part of their gang 
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initiations or activities, such as in acts of perpetration toward rival gang members 
(Alleyne & Wood, 2010; Klein & Maxson, 2006). Similarly, 18% of juvenile arrests in 
2011 fell within the category of violent crimes (e.g., murder, aggravated assault, robbery, 
and forcible rape; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2013) 
suggesting a large percentage of detained youth have caused significant harm to others. 
Furthermore, these events may be more similar to the level of traumatic transgressive 
events that the MIES and construct of moral injury were originally theorized to 
encompass. Therefore, studying moral injury in these at-risk youth populations could 
allow scholars the opportunity to examine moral injury in a population with transgressive 
events that transcend the mild events (i.e., cheating in romantic relationships) that were 
reported in the current sample. Subsequently, the transgressions of these at risk youth 
should be given particular attention as the construct of moral injury is further validated.  
In the current study, we were able to demonstrate that the structure of the 
MIPSASY was invariant across women and men. Further, we did not observe gender 
differences between men and women on the MIPSASY scales and subscales. However, 
future research may find gender differences in the way the Litz and colleague’s model 
(2009) of moral injury operates in terms of its proposed mechanisms, risk factors, and 
protective factors. For example, the extant literature suggests that women and girls may 
be more prone to experience and guilt as well as invested in maintaining interpersonal 
relationships in comparison to men (Skoe et al., 1996; Williams & Bybee, 1994), and 
therefore women and girls may be at differential risk for developing moral injury. In 
terms of protective factors, Litz and his colleagues (2009) proposed that having forgiving 
social supports may help mitigate the effects of moral injury by reducing the degree to 
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which the individual experiences their transgression as conflictual and dissonant. 
Previous research suggests that women perceive and benefit more from social support in 
comparison to men and that this effect may be related to gender roles (Reevy & Maslach, 
2001). Further, studies about the relations among PTSD, social, support, and gender, 
suggest that gender may moderate the association between social support from significant 
others and PTSD symptoms (Andrew et al., 2003; Crevier et al., 2014).  Therefore, future 
research should investigate how social support may function differently among men and 




Our study adds to the growing literature on moral injury and is the first study to 
describe how moral injury may be implicated in youth’s moral development. To this aim 
we developed the MIPSASY, a measure designed to assess moral injury and factors that 
may mitigate the development of moral injury in children, adolescents, and emerging 
adults. Results indicated that the MIPSASY is a valid, reliable, and invariant measure of 
moral injury for youth. Future research will need to continue to validate the MIPSASY in 
youth populations given that moral injury is an important construct to include in the study 
















MORAL INJURY PERPETRATION, SELF-FORGIVENESS, AND  
ATONEMENT  SCALES FOR YOUTH (MIPSASY)  
 
Instructions: Please read each statement carefully and circle the number that best 
describes how you feel right now. Remember to rate each item and circle only one 














Perpetration of moral injury      
Commission with agency      
1. I have done things to other people 
that I think are wrong 
     
2. I have done things to other people 
that break my own personal rules 
about what is right and wrong 
     
3. I have done things that hurt another 
person  
     
4. I have done bad things to someone 
     
5. I have done things to other people 
that I think I should be punished for 
     
6. I have done harm to other people and 
that bothers me  
     
Commission under duress      
7. I have been forced to do things to 
others that I think are wrong 
     
8. I have been forced to do things to 
others that break my own personal 
rules about what is right and wrong 
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9. Someone else has made me do a bad 
thing to another person 
     
10. Even though I didn’t want to, others 
have forced me to do hurtful  things 
to people 
     
11. People have made me do bad things 
to others even when I didn’t want to  
     
Omission      
12. I let a bad thing happen to someone 
when I should have done something 
to stop it 
     
13. There have been times when I failed 
to do the right thing and someone 
else got hurt 
     
14. I feel disappointed with myself 
because there are times when I have 
just stood by and let a bad thing 
happen to another person 
     
Witnessing morally injurious events      
15. .I have seen people do things that 
break my own personal rules about 
what is right and wrong. 
     
16. I have seen someone do bad things to 
other people and that bothers me 
     
17. I feel betrayed by people I once 
trusted 
     
18. Someone I trusted did something I 
think is really wrong 
     
Self-forgiveness      
19. I can never forgive myself for the 
hurtful things I’ve done to other 
people 
     
20. Although I have done some bad 
things to people, over time I’ve been 
able to forgive myself for them (R) 
     
21. I feel like I’m a bad person because 
of the bad things I’ve done to others 
     
22. I’ve learned from the bad things I’ve 
done to people and that has helped 
me to forgive myself for them(R) 
     
23. With time, I’ve been able to forgive 
myself for wrong things I’ve done to 
others (R) 
     
24. I can’t stop criticizing myself for 
things I’ve done wrong to other 
people 




25. When I think about hurtful things 
I’ve done to others, I want to punish 
myself 
     
26. Even though I’ve done  bad things to 
others, I try not to be too hard on 
myself (R) 
     
27. When I think about bad things I’ve 
done to others, I put myself down 
     
28. Even though I’ve done things that 
hurt other people, I believe I am still 
an okay person (R) 
     
29. When I think about the ways I’ve 
hurt others, I believe I am a bad 
person 
     
30. When I think about bad things I’ve 
done to others, I believe I still 
deserve to be loved (R) 
     
31. When I think of the ways I have hurt 
others, I feel ashamed of myself 
     
32. When I think of the ways I’ve hurt 
others, I feel like I shouldn’t show 
my face in public 
     
33. When I think of the bad things I’ve 
done to others, I feel like I have no 
right to be part of society 
     
      
Forgivability by others      
34. I can never be forgiven for the things 
I’ve done wrong to other people(R) 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. People are never going to forgive me 
for the ways I have done harm to 
others(R) 
     
36. I will be forgiven for the bad things 
I’ve done to others 
     
37. People will be able to accept me even 
though I’ve done hurtful things to 
others 
     
      
Belief in atonement      
38. There are things I can do to make up 
for the bad things I’ve done to others 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. Even though I’ve done things to other 
people that are wrong, I believe I can 





































still make it better 
40. There is nothing I can do to make up 
for the bad things I have done to 
others(R) 
1 2 3 4 5 
41. I’ve hurt other people and there is 
nothing I can ever do to make up for it 
(R) 
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